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Abstract
Aim of study: The paper explores whether the legislative proposal for the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) after 2021 and the 
novelty of comprehensive strategic planning at Member State (MS) level can bring about a greener, more multifunctional policy paradigm. 
While existing research has explored long-term policy change over the entire decision-making process, this study aims to demonstrate the 
usefulness of conducting policy analysis at the inception of the legislative procedure.
Area of study: The study applies to the European Union.
Material and methods: The research employs a qualitative method of policy analysis, using a combination of three theoretical fra-
meworks – social learning, path dependency and intergovernmentalism. Extensive document analysis and in-depth interviews were applied 
to evaluate the proposed reform and gauge the responses of key interest groups.
Main results: The proposal holds potential for a substantial overall greening of the policy but will be strongly dependent on implemen-
tation at the MS level; the institutional framework provides space for increased environmental ambition, but does not guarantee it, as the 
proposed safeguards are too weak.   
Research highlights: More accountability is required during the formulation and implementation of Strategic Plans. Due to strong ele-
ments of path dependency and intergovernmentalism, an overall paradigm shift at EU level is unlikely. Strengthening the role of MSs is 
weakening the commonality of the policy that guarantees at least minimal environmental standards.
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Introduction
For years, the public (Eurobarometer, 2018), consu-
mers and environmental non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) (e.g., EEB et al., 2018), researchers (e.g. Hart & 
Bas-Defossez, 2018; Lakner & Pe’er, 2018; Recanati et al., 
2019) and the European Court of Auditors (ECA, 2019) 
have been criticizing the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP), demanding a paradigm shift towards an environ-
mentally, socially and economically more sustainable po-
licy. On June 1st, 2018, the European Commission (EC) 
published (EC, 2018a) legislative proposals introducing a 
new element to the CAP, namely comprehensive Strategic 
Plans at Member State (MS) level. Applying compulsory 
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planning – which was already established for Rural Deve-
lopment policy (Pillar 2) and in the fruit and vegetables 
sector – to the entire CAP arguably represents the greatest 
novelty of the reform proposal. The other new element 
proposed is a new green architecture, described by the EC 
as having the potential to bring about a radical greening 
of the policy.
The EC (2020) sees the proposal as ’guaranteeing 
higher ambition on environmental and climate action’, as 
it is intended to introduce result-based, rather than com-
pliance-based, policymaking. Within the “New Delivery 
Model”, common policy goals (priorities), indicators, 
eligible interventions and certain eligibility conditions 
will be set at the European Union (EU) level. MSs will 
determine national operative goals based on the assess-
ment of particular needs, adaptations of measures and 
provisions for monitoring progress, all based on a clearly 
established intervention logic (Erjavec et al., 2018). Im-
portantly, all this is probably to take place in the context 
of substantially reduced EU funding (Matthews, 2018; 
EC, 2019).
Three different paradigms (Moyer & Josling, 2002; 
Alons, 2019) can be said to be currently competing for 
dominance as the CAP’s main ideational framework: the 
state-assisted (or mercantilist or dependent), the com-
petitive (or market-liberal), and the multi-functional (or 
post-productivist). Environmental considerations are the 
main constitutive element of the multifunctional para-
digm, which legitimizes financial support for the “Eu-
ropean model of agriculture” (Potter & Burney, 2002; 
Potter & Tilzey, 2007; Midgley & Renwick, 2012). Nu-
merous critics (see e.g., Bohman et al., 1999; Potter & 
Burney, 2002; Garzon, 2005) have claimed that mul-
ti-functionality has merely been a smokescreen to con-
tinue subsidization of the European farming sector – but 
could it become the prevalent paradigm? Can the “New 
Delivery Model” answer the demands of European so-
ciety for a paradigm shift; will the new CAP lead to a 
‘transition to a more sustainable agriculture’, as claimed 
by the Commission (EC, 2018b)? Why has the EC propo-
sed such policy changes?
As no existing theoretical framework can indepen-
dently explain changes of the CAP adequately (de la 
Rosa, 2010), in answering the above questions, we have 
analysed the legislative proposals (EC, 2018a) by appl-
ying and combining the insights of three theoretical mo-
dels: Hall’s (1993) model of social learning (SL), which 
is suitable for identifying “major policy change” (Cair-
ney, 2012); path dependency (Levi, 1997), which is use-
ful for describing policy processes resistant to change, 
such as the CAP (Moyer & Josling, 2002); and intergo-
vernmentalism, which offers insights into the balance of 
intergovernmental and supranational elements of policy, 
in our case the transfer of responsibility from the EC to 
MSs (Moravcsik, 1991).
Drawing on these theories, we attempted to explain the 
elements of the current proposal and predict the result of 
the reform process in terms of bringing about significant 
policy change. As the biggest flaw in the current system is 
arguably the weak environmental institutional framework 
(relevant measures, their content, budgetary allocation 
and monitoring/evaluation framework), we used the con-
tent and quality of the proposed institutional framework 
as an indirect indicator for such policy change. In addi-
tion, we garnered the responses of key interest groups, 
Members of European Parliament (MEPs) and Member 
States (represented in the Council of the EU), to gauge 
their policy preferences, as well as those of prominent 
analysts, who can offer additional insight into the poten-
tial direction of reform.
Existing research has explored long-term policy chan-
ge over the entire decision-making process (e.g., Moyer & 
Josling, 2002; Garzon, 2006; Nedergaard, 2008; Feindt, 
2010); our study aims to demonstrate the usefulness of 
conducting policy analysis by using three theoretical mo-
dels of change at the inception of the legislative proce-
dure. Our analysis, using an approach that combines the 
abovementioned three models, thus attempts to compre-
hensively examine which elements of the legislative pro-
posal and political environment demonstrate the potential 
of the proposed CAP to deliver the paradigmatic change 
required to bring about a substantially greener policy, as 
suggested by the Commission (EC, 2018c). We also pro-
vide tentative policy recommendations that could support 
this shift.
Material and methods
The context: key elements of the proposed reform 
Three main topics (see Table 1) have dominated the 
public discussions surrounding the proposal: 1) the an-
nounced reduction in the CAP budget; 2) introduction 
of national strategic planning for the entire CAP; 3) 
changes in the environmental architecture of the po-
licy. The latter two constitute the biggest substantive 
policy change.
A reduced budget
The Commission’s Multiannual Financial Framework 
(MFF) proposal tabled the largest overall reduction in the 
CAP budget so far, largely owing to Brexit and new bud-
getary considerations. It has proposed an overall reduction 
of 3% in current prices, which amounts to 15 in constant 
2018 prices; the lion’s share of this reduction falls upon 
Pillar 2 (28%), but Pillar 1 would also see a substantial 
decrease (11%). The Commission also suggested that 
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it decrease cofinancing rates in Pillar 2 by 10% and ac-
companied this with the possibility for MSs to transfer 
up to 15% of their CAP allocations between direct pay-
ments and rural development, as well as an additional 
15% from Pillar 1 to Pillar 2 for environmental and cli-
mate measures without co-financing (EC, 2018a; Massot 
& Negre, 2018). 
Strategic planning for the entire CAP
Strategic Plans will draw on assessments of each MS’s 
particular needs using SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities, threats) analysis. According to the propo-
sal, each Plan will require prior approval by the Com-
mission to ensure consistency with nine specific EU-le-
vel objectives outlined in the proposal, of which three 
are environmental (climate change mitigation and adap-
tation and sustainable energy; sustainable development 
and natural resources; biodiversity, ecosystem services, 
habitats and landscapes). MSs will independently defi-
ne common elements of interventions in their Strategic 
Plans, as well as requirements of the new system of en-
vironmental “conditionality” (see below). Further, they 
will set target values and benchmarks for all common 
and specific indicators and choose instruments from the 
offered set based on a sound intervention logic specified 
for each specific objective. They will have to demons-
trate comprehensiveness and conformity with goals in 
environmental and climate legislation and enclose a re-
view of the environmental and climate architecture of 
their Strategic Plan. They will also have to show that 
the allocation of financial resources to interventions is 
proportionate to set targets. Importantly, there should be 
no backsliding in environmental and climate objectives 
(EC, 2018a).
Implementation will be carried out through a system 
of monitoring and review, under which MSs will prepare 
annual performance reports using a system of indicators 
to be agreed at the Union level. In case of a more than 
25% deviation, the Commission may demand of the MS 
to prepare an Action Plan with corrective measures. In 
extreme cases, when an MS formulates no Plan or it is 
inadequate, payments may be withheld. Conversely, a 
system to reward environmental and climate performan-
ce is also proposed, under which MSs meeting their tar-
gets will receive a "bonus" of 5% of their allocated rural 
development funds for 2027 (EC, 2018a).
“New green architecture”
The CAP’s green architecture, which currently relies 
on cross-compliance (conditioning of some CAP pay-
ments upon compliance with certain other requirements, 
including environmental ones), greening requirements re-
lated to direct payments, and voluntary agri-environmen-
tal and climate measures, will be changed in form and 
content (Fig. 1); the new model will allow MSs to devise 
a mixture of mandatory and voluntary measures in both 
Pillars to meet the environmental and climate objectives 
defined at EU level.
Under ‘enhanced conditionality’, income support will 
be conditional upon observing a higher baseline standard 
of environmental and climate practices, subsuming both 
greening and cross-compliance requirements. Additio-
nal environmental/climate benefits will supposedly be 
achieved through flexible eco-schemes in Pillar 1 and 
agri-environment-climate schemes in Pillar 2 that will 
allow MSs/Regions to target their specific concerns. 
Analytical framework 
In this study, we applied policy analysis, a key method 
for examining and evaluating complex public policies and 
Table 1. Main proposed changes of the common agricultural policy (CAP) – Summary
Current system Proposed system Substantive change
Budget (total CAP, in 2018 
constant prices†)
€ 382,855 million € 324,284 million -15% [11% reduction in Pillar 
1, 28% reduction in Pillar 2] 
Strategic planning Only in Pillar 2 Entire policy Greater flexibility for MS but 
within constraints of common 
objectives; supervisory role 
for Commission
Green architecture Cross compliance (Pillar 1 
and some Pillar 2 payments); 
Green direct payments; AES 
(Pillar 2)
Enhanced conditionality, 
Eco-schemes (Pillar 1), AES 
(Pillar 2)
Enhanced conditionality re-
places cross compliance and 
greening requirements
† Calculations by Matthews (2018). AES: agri-environmental schemes
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suitable for determining how a policy will achieve a given 
set of goals (Sabatier, 1991). As there are no comprehen-
sive theories on policymaking and analysis (Radin, 2000), 
we employed a combination of models that we find the 
most appropriate for explaining the CAP (Moyer & Josling, 
2002; Garzon, 2006; Nedergaard, 2008; Feindt, 2010). Whi-
le we are primarily interested in substantive policy change, 
theory studying European integration is also relevant due to 
the Commission’s proposal to transfer some powers back to 
the MS level.
Social learning model
Hall’s (1993) historical institutionalist concept of so-
cial learning (Coleman et al., 1996; Coleman, 1998; Mo-
yer & Josling, 2002; Garzon, 2006; Feindt, 2010), is the 
most widely deployed in studies on policy change in the 
CAP (Moyson et al., 2017).
According to Hall (1993), SL is “a deliberate attempt 
to adjust the goals or techniques of policy in response 
to past experience and new information”. He suggested 
that a stable policy paradigm, defined as “a framework of 
ideas and standards that specify not only the goals of poli-
cy and the instruments that can be used to attain them, but 
also the very nature of the problems that they are meant 
to be addressing” (ideational framework), might begin to 
weaken if it ceases adequately to provide solutions for po-
licy problems. As anomalies accumulate, policy makers 
will alter instrument settings and experiment with new 
instruments to address them. Continuing failure will con-
vince actors that serious anomalies cannot be addressed 
within the established paradigm. Consequently, the autho-
rity of the relevant policy community becomes fragmen-
ted and politically contested (Feindt, 2010). The change 
in the ideational framework (hierarchy of goals) is thus 
preceded by “shifts in the locus of authority over policy” 
(Hall, 1993). Finally, the ideational framework itself will 
be changed.
Oliver & Pemberton (2004) emphasized that paradigm 
failure does not necessarily lead to its replacement. New 
ideas may be rejected, partially adopted or result in a full 
paradigm shift; their incorporation into the prevailing pa-
radigm constitutes “paradigm evolution” rather than “pa-
radigm revolution”. Garzon (2006), drawing on Coleman 
et al. (1996), also stressed that cumulative adjustments 
can deliver paradigm change, and contends that this in-
deed has occurred with the CAP.
There is general agreement of stakeholders and analysts 
that the full paradigm shift towards multifunctionality has 
not occurred (Feindt, 2010), as evidenced by the numerous 
calls for reform (e.g. Pe’er et al., 2019; IPES-Food, 2019; 
GFGF, 2019), as well as the results of various studies on 
the impacts of the CAP on the environment (e.g. Reif & 
Vermouzek, 2019; Alliance Environnement, 2019a,b); 
though there is merit in Garzon’s (2006) claims that a re-
placement of the dependent paradigm is occurring, we find 
it highly contentious to declare it completed. The Com-
mission’s reform proposal as a visible product of learning 
allows us to assess the extent of its learning; SL of the 
entire policy community could only be indicated by actual 
policy change. In this paper, we attempt to assess both 
the extent of ‘learning’ (change in the hierarchy of goals) 
done by the Commission and that of the wider policy 
community.
Methodologically, studies of CAP reforms based on 
the SL approach have employed document analysis (Mo-
yer & Josling, 2002; Garzon, 2006) and / or interviews 
with key actors (Feindt, 2010) to identify policy learning 
by examining which variables change: policy settings 
(first order), instruments (second order) or the ideational 
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Figure 1. Current and proposed green architecture. Source: European Commission
Spanish Journal of Agricultural Research September 2020 • Volume 18 • Issue 3 • e0111
5Does the proposed CAP reform allow for a paradigm shift towards a greener policy?
Liberal intergovernmentalism
Liberal intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik, 1991, 
1993, 1998) may help to clarify why it is difficult to 
achieve paradigm shifts in the CAP. It claims that MSs 
have always guarded their national interests, trying to 
avoid granting supreme authority to central institutions 
that could weaken their sovereignty, preferring to work 
through intergovernmental institutions such as the Coun-
cil of Ministers (Moravcsik, 1991). MSs accept only as 
much independence of EU bodies as is consistent with 
their interests; the CAP exists only to serve those inte-
rests. MSs as economically interdependent agents play a 
two-level game in which the domestic political process is 
the primary determinant of their policy preferences at the 
EU level; further, it is the relative bargaining power of 
MSs and incentives for institutionalisation that determine 
the outcomes of negotiations. We posit that the proposal 
reflects a policy environment unfavourable for continued 
fully supranational management due to excessively di-
vergent national policy preferences and situations. As 
this includes the environmental field, the reduced su-
pranationalism is likely to undermine environmental 
goals in most MSs and therefore also at the aggregate 
EU level. 
Although intergovernmentalism studies are not based 
on a distinctly defined methodological framework, they 
all focus on the role of states and national governments 
in particular as primary actors in the integration process; 
their prevalent method of analysis is document analysis. 
Path dependency
The CAP is highly resistant to change (Moyer & Jos-
ling, 2002; Greer, 2013; von Cramon-Taubadel, 2017); to 
explain this resistance, the concept of path dependency 
(PD) is useful (Kay, 2003). PD constrains future choi-
ce sets and links decision-making through time (North, 
1990). Due to positive feedback loops, steps in a parti-
cular direction induce further movements in the same 
direction (Pierson, 2000). Departure from an existing 
policy path occurs only when the current one becomes 
manifestly untenable (Moyer & Josling, 2002). The con-
cept of divergence from a given policy path can be linked 
to paradigm change, or third-order policy change sensu 
Hall (1993). 
Kay (2003) listed three types of feedback mechanism 
pertinent to the CAP: 1) its effect on interest groups, 2) 
its influence on state capacities (administrative resour-
ces) and 3) consequences at the individual (beneficiary) 
level in terms of sunk costs. According to him, pre-
1992 CAP changes were moderate and in response to 
runaway budgetary costs, while the MacSharry reforms 
of 1992 were the result of shocks to the existing policy 
path. He concluded that policy may change significantly 
over time without a “big bang” event. He (Kay, 2005) 
also pointed out, referring to Hall (1993), that under the 
three-level categorization of policy change, policy chan-
ge and policy stability may be observed simultaneously. 
Henke et al. (2017) introduced the concept of “natio-
nal path dependency”, combining EU path dependency 
and adaptation of the CAP to conditions at the national 
level. The 2013 CAP reform introduced a new system 
of direct payments that gave MSs the freedom to mo-
dulate certain elements, adapting it for the first time to 
their respective policy needs. The reform was regarded 
by Bache et al. (2014) as ‘further contributing to the 
fragmentation and re-nationalization of the CAP’; they 
consider this shift as indicative of the relevance of in-
tergovernmental theories of the EU. The current reform 
proposal, by applying national strategic planning to the 
entire CAP, may represent a further step along the line 
of national path dependency. We posit that, due to strong 
vested interests, the policy as a whole will be unable to 
overcome its inertia and will continue along the depen-
dent paradigm.
PD is difficult to operationalize empirically (Kay, 
2005) – it provides neither a general list of variables for 
diagnostic and prescriptive inquiry nor hypotheses about 
specific links between variables (Ostrom, 1999). Studies 
on PD have predominantly performed document analy-
sis of CAP reforms (Moyer & Josling, 2002; Kay, 2003; 
Henke et al., 2017). 
Methodology implementation 
The research employed a qualitative method of po-
licy analysis based on a combination of three theore-
tical approaches to evaluate the CAP reform. To com-
prehensively address the problem, we employed a 
combination of extensive document analysis and in-depth 
interviews.
Different sources of data reflecting the variety of views 
of the interest groups that influence policy development 
were used to gain a more complete insight into the pro-
blem. We analysed secondary data – statements of re-
presentatives of think tanks, researchers and key interest 
groups published in specialized publications, blogs, press 
releases and on webpages – and original data based on 
semi-structured interviews conducted by e-mail. The data 
were derived from a variety of sources:
1.  Press releases and policy statements published on 
interest organisations’ webpages and official pa-
ges of the EU’s institutions. Where these were not 
directly available, we referred to Agra-Facts and 
Agra-Focus, comprehensive newsletters addressing 
the CAP and reporting on statements of the EC, 
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MEPs, MSs and interest groups (October 2017 – 
May 2020). These sources were used to gauge the 
prevalent hierarchy of goals in the policy commu-
nity and potential crucial differences between the 
preferences of MSs. 
2. A review of expert publications and blog posts by 
researchers and policy analysts dealing in the CAP 
published since the publication of the Communica-
tion (EC, 2017) introducing the reform (capreform.
eu, arc2020.eu, the Institute for European Envi-
ronmental Policy (IEEP), Farm Europe, as well as 
analyses conducted by the ECA), to estimate the 
quality of the proposal in terms of the ability of the 
institutional framework to support a significantly 
better environmental performance. 
3. Interviews with members of the policy expert com-
munity, such as members of the Special Committee 
on Agriculture (2), key interest organisations (2 – 
COPA-COGECA1  and CEJA2 ) and environmen-
tal organisations (2 – BirdLife and EEB3 ), and 4 
representatives of the research community dealing 
with the CAP. These interviews were used to su-
pplement the above two sources and further the 
understanding of both the prevalent opinion in the 
policy community and the institutional framework.
In the analysis, we followed the process of thematic 
analysis, which is the most common qualitative method 
used to find common patterns across a data set (Rubin & 
Rubin, 2005), based on documents or texts of interviews. 
Primarily, key themes or patterns of meaning regarding 
environmental policy change that come up repeatedly 
were defined, named and categorised into three main con-
cepts according to different policy models. To assess the 
degree of change proposed by the Commission according 
to the social learning and path dependency models, we 
firstly identified which elements of the proposal indicate a 
change (or lack of change) in the hierarchy of policy prio-
rities, and the quality of the proposed framework in terms 
of its ability to substantially contribute towards achie-
ving environmental goals. We also examined reactions of 
think-tanks, investigating whether they see the proposed 
institutional framework as supporting a paradigm shift 
towards a radically greener CAP, and representatives of 
key interest groups, to find out whether the policy com-
munity itself supports this shift.
In the framework of intergovernmentalism, the thema-
tic focus was based on the shift of responsibility from EU 
1  Comité des organisations professionnelles agricoles-Comité général de la coopération agricole de l'Union européenne, Committee of Professional Agricultural Organisa-
tions-General Confederation of Agricultural Cooperatives 
2  Conseil Européen des Jeunes Agriculteurs, European council of young farmers 
3  The European Environmental Bureau 
to MS level, which was put in context by examining the 
Commission’s substantiation of the shift and comparing it 
with explicit national preferences as expressed by national 
representatives in the Council of Agricultural ministers. 
In the next steps, we examined how the identified themes 
were patterned and supported the three theoretical models. 
Finally, we formed coherent narratives that included quo-
tes from the analysed texts. All authors conducted coding 
manually and independently, with regular discussions of 
the coding process to limit possible inconsistencies.
Results
While the Commission cites (EC, 2018c) major chan-
ges taking place since the 2013 reform (i.e. higher market 
uncertainty, a shift from multilateral to bilateral and re-
gional trade negotiations and new EU international com-
mitments on climate change and sustainable development 
goals), none of these seems a shock capable of significant-
ly changing the policy’s overall trajectory. The last ele-
ment comes the closest, as it is related to what does seem 
to be a big shock, i.e. budgetary cuts related to the UK’s 
exit from the bloc and new concerns weighing on the EU 
budget. Another potential ‘shock’ could be an increased 
interest of society in the sustainability of food production 
and, by extension, the CAP, as reflected in the results of 
the public consultation (Ecorys, 2017).
Despite these disturbances, the hierarchy of the poli-
cy’s challenges or goals remains fundamentally the same 
as in the previous period (1. Economic; 2. Environmental 
and climate; 3. Socio-economic). Economic goals (far-
mers’ incomes) retain primacy – before environmental 
and social goals and other, new, objectives; this is reflec-
ted in the ordering of objectives in the proposal, but even 
more so in the proportion of funds allocated to Pillar 1, 
which is primarily dedicated to income support. However, 
the inclusion of the flexible eco-scheme in Pillar 1 does 
allow for substantial tweaking based on MS preferences, 
though the Commission is explicit in the assertion that the 
CAP’s main objectives will be defined at the Union level.
Looking at the proposal more closely, there are im-
portant provisions that could potentially support a shift 
towards an environmentally more effective policy: i) the 
principle of no backsliding regarding environmental and 
climate objectives; ii) the need to take into account com-
mon EU objectives, three of which are environmental; 
iii) enhanced conditionality; iv) the system of sanctions 
and rewards conditioned upon performance; v) the requi-
rement for MSs to use a ‘sound intervention logic’ and 
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justify choices; vi) the possibility to amend Plans (and 
for the Commission to demand amendment and condition 
payments upon it); vii) the requirement of preparing a Na-
tional Environmental and Climate Plan; viii) reservation 
of 30% of Pillar 2 funds to agri-environmental-climate 
measures; ix) the possibility of shifting funds to Pillar 2 
without the obligation to co-finance measures. However, 
many of these provisions are wrought with issues, which 
we present below.
Accountability: monitoring and evaluation 
framework
The main critique in terms of quality expressed by 
environmentally oriented stakeholders as well as resear-
chers is related to the lack of accountability due to the 
lack of quantified objectives at EU level (e.g., BirdLife, 
2018; Farm Europe, 2018; Pe’er et al., 2019). Since no 
indicators or targets are explicitly defined at the EU level 
and there is no procedure envisaged enabling the Com-
mission to define national targets (that would add up to a 
common EU target) in dialogue with MSs, this will be left 
to MSs, which will likely focus on the selection of mea-
sures and modalities of implementation, rather than defi-
ning needs and objectives (based on a sound intervention 
logic) in a measurable manner. Relying on defining needs 
based solely on SWOT analysis (a soft approach) may add 
to the danger of poor decision making; a quantitatively 
substantiated definition of needs might be better placed 
to ensure good governance; this opinion is shared both by 
interviewees and the ECA (2019). 
IEEP researchers highlight that the three environmen-
tal objectives and their relating indicators are not directly 
linked to existing environmental legislation, which could 
ensure better integration (cf. Hart et al., 2018). This raises 
concerns about the targets that MSs are likely to set, as 
well as their capacity to assess their progress and identify 
gaps. Similarly, it will be difficult for the Commission to 
assess MS performance and hold them accountable if ob-
jectives are not clearly articulated.
A further potential weakness of the proposal is the pro-
cess of approval of Strategic Plans, the only mechanism 
in the Commission’s hands that could ensure targeted and 
ambitious strategic planning. It will face time limits, limi-
ted data and a varying capacity of actors in different MSs. 
This will likely be compounded by political pressures to 
approve Plans in order to prevent ‘delays in paying out di-
rect aid to farmers’ (a statement expressed by the majority 
of MSs (AT, BE, CY, EE, ES, FI, FR, HR, HU, IE, IT, LT, 
LU, LV, MT, PL, PT, SI, SK) in Council and strongly in-
dicative of the strength of the dependent paradigm; Agra-
Facts, 2018a; CoEU, 2018a). Moreover, background do-
cuments and analyses envisaged in the annexes to national 
Strategic Plans will be exempt from evaluation.
Some researchers warn that flexibility is often used by 
MSs to select the least ambitious approach (cf. Alliance 
Environnement & Thünen Institute, 2017), especially on 
environmental and climate targets. Numerous environ-
mental and agri-environmental NGOs perceive the pro-
posal as increasing subsidiarity without putting in place 
the necessary accountability mechanisms, which may re-
sult in a “race to the bottom” (Plateforme pour une autre 
PAC, 2018).
In “Last chance CAP” (EEB et al., 2018), four envi-
ronmental NGOs warn that the proposed reporting obli-
gations are inadequate and question whether the new 
CAP can really be result-based, as it “merely incentivises 
weakly designed environmental commitments in order to 
maximize enrolment and be recognised by the EC as a 
‘good performer’.” Farm Europe (2018) also warns that 
MSs will be tempted to reduce environmental require-
ments and ambitions in order to secure the additional 5% 
of the envelope for environmental performance and pro-
vide a cost advantage for their farms.
Institutional capacity of member states
Under new rules, the Commission’s role will mainly be 
to validate Strategic Plans and monitor their implemen-
tation, and potentially to impose sanctions. This means 
that the main responsibility for planning and performan-
ce will be transferred to MSs, where the quality of the 
Plans will depend on that of the policy system in place. 
To make a shift towards a policy focused on results (in-
cluding environmental), a shift towards evidence-based 
policymaking will be required, and this will in turn de-
pend on the strategic orientation of decision-makers and 
the national implementing apparatus, the existence of 
good analytical support systems, as well as engagement 
of agricultural and other stakeholders. As stated by an 
interviewee, the capacity of actors in different MSs va-
ries, so we can expect significant differentiation in the 
quality of implementation of the new model. Relevant 
discussions of agricultural ministers in Council reflect 
some of these considerations. For example, while most 
MSs in principle support the shift towards a results-based 
model, many have expressed misgivings regarding their 
ability to submit annual performance reports on time, and 
some have called for greater flexibility in the first years 
of implementation (CoEU, 2018b). In addition, the Com-
mission itself will likely have to invest in enhancing its 
institutional capacities to support this undertaking.
Budgetary considerations
The proposed reductions (and concomitant increase in 
MS co-financing rates) in the Pillar 2 budget, which is 
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traditionally orientated towards addressing environmental 
and ‘other’ goals (EC, 2018c), seriously jeopardize envi-
ronmental considerations, as the funds for agri-environ-
mental schemes are not guaranteed. The lack of ring-fen-
cing for eco-schemes (Pillar 1) has also been criticised by 
experts as the “single greatest weakness of the proposal” 
(Meredith & Hart, 2019), as the allocation of funds (in 
addition to the content of the schemes themselves) is left 
to the discretion of MSs. 
Support for a shift in the policy community 
The thinking of farm representatives still seems to be 
embedded within the dependent paradigm (cf. Burton 
& Wilson, 2006; McGuire et al., 2013; van Dijk et al., 
2016): food production and income support are primary 
concerns, free trade is a threat and environmental obliga-
tions are a constraint. They have consistently criticized 
budget cuts, stating that achieving common objectives 
requires a common policy with a strong budget; they in-
voke i.a. high environmental ambition, preserving rural 
areas, production of quality food, and trade pressures as 
elements justifying the level of funding (COPA-COGE-
CA, 2018). According to COPA-COGECA, farmers can-
not accept further cuts to the budget (COPA-COGECA, 
2020).
In Parliament’s Committee on Agriculture and Rural 
development (COMAGRI), the then-rapporteur MEP Es-
ther Herranz-García, was also adamant about keeping the 
level of financing, as the main goal must to be to support 
life in rural areas (CoEU, 2018c). The new COMAGRI 
chair Norbert Lins has also stated that cuts to the farm 
budget should be avoided (Euractiv, 2020). In Council, 
Ireland’s Agriculture minister called for an increased EU 
budget (Independent, 2019), saying that “Farmers will 
not thank us for that, as we are asking them to do more 
in terms of the environment and climate change and pa-
ying them less”. Similarly, the Hungarian minister stated 
that “we cannot ask farmers to do more for less money” 
(CoEU, 2019a). 
A number of MSs (AT, BE, CY, CZ, EE, FR, IT, LT, 
LU, LV, PL, PT, RO, SI, SK) have echoed this concern 
on different occasions (e.g. CoEU, 2019b), stating that a 
higher level of environmental ambition must be backed 
by adequate financial resources. The new Commissioner 
Janusz Wojciechowski has also expressed the need for 
“a stronger budget” and appropriate support within the 
context of the new Commission’s new focus on sustai-
nability (CoEU, 2019a). The unveiling of the European 
Green Deal and announcement of the Farm to fork stra-
tegy seem to have further reinforced these calls by MSs 
(e.g. CoEU, 2020). 
Conversely, environmentalists, researchers and the 
public opinion are demanding “public goods for public 
money” in accordance with the multifunctional paradigm. 
For example, BirdLife Europe has called for at least €15 
billion per year for effective biodiversity measures and the 
elimination of “perverse subsidies”, particularly for fac-
tory farming and intensive agriculture (BirdLife, 2018). 
In its assessment of the proposals, the ECA (2019) states: 
“While the case for EU environmental and climate-chan-
ge-related actions is strong, the data and the arguments 
used to support the needs assessment for farmers’ income 
are insufficient.” There is also a strong push in Council 
(CoEU, 2019c) by a number of MSs (BG, CY, CZ, EE, 
EL, FI, HR, HU, LT, LV, MT, PL, PT, SI, SK) to retain the 
Pillar 2 budget; they have called the cut disproportionate, 
especially in light of increased environmental ambition, 
though this may be an attempt to retain funding more than 
it is to strengthen environmental ambition. 
National policy preferences
The Commission itself states in its impact assessment 
that changes are being instituted to accommodate the 
‘wide diversity of farming conditions across the EU’ (EC, 
2018c), but a look at national preferences reveals that the-
re is a high diversity of opinions, including on environ-
mental ambition, which may be irreconcilable at this time. 
These are reflected for example in:
 − Diametrically opposing opinions on Voluntary cou-
pled support (a market-distorting measure generally 
recognised as detrimental to the environment, as it 
stimulates higher livestock density and input usa-
ge), with DE, DK, NL, and SE strongly opposed to 
it, BE, IT, FI, LV, MT and SI seeing it as essential to 
maintain production in rural areas, and some coun-
tries even suggesting an increase compared to the 
proposed percentage in a non-paper (tabled by BG, 
CZ, HR, HU, LV, SK and SI, backed by FI, FR, IT, 
MT and PL; Agra-Facts, 2019a; CoEU, 2019d).
 − A variety of responses (CoEU, 2018d; Agra-facts, 
2018b) regarding the environmental ambition of the 
proposal, with NL and SE e.g. praising the move 
towards result-based schemes and others (e.g. HU, 
IE) focussing more on the issue of funding it, clai-
ming that it is not possible to ask for higher envi-
ronmental ambition while reducing funding.
 − Differences regarding the exemption of smallhol-
ders from conditionality requirements, with some 
(LV, PL, CY, EL, HR, HU, BG, IT, MT and LT) 
wishing to give them preferential treatment, and 
others (NL, FR, CZ, BE, DK, LU and SK) saying 
that all farmers should be treated equally (CoEU, 
2019e; Agra-Facts, 2019b).
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Conversely, there have been no objections to the in-
tention to retain direct payments, a measure introduced 
almost two decades ago as a temporary compensatory 
instrument. This lack of opposition seems indicative of 
an overall entrenchment of the policy community in the 
dependent paradigm.
Discussion 
This paper has examined whether the proposal for a 
new CAP could open the door to a fundamentally greener 
policy; to do this, we argue that social learning of the third 
level (Hall, 1993) is required to counteract the policy’s 
path dependency (Kay, 2003). Moreover, we argue that 
the shift of powers from the EU to the MS level can be ex-
plained using insights from liberal intergovernmentalism 
(Moravcsik, 1991, 1993, 1998).
Potential for paradigmatic change
In terms of assessing SL and the order of policy 
change in the reform, our analysis has shown that the 
proposal does hold potential for a substantial overall 
greening of the policy. The conditions for a paradigma-
tic shift (Moyer & Josling, 2002) seem present: there 
is broad dissatisfaction with existing policies and ins-
truments, there are shifts in the external environment 
(various reports on the environmental impacts of agri-
culture), and there seems to be broader ideological and 
political climate change, if mass demonstrations and 
the last EU parliamentary elections (in May 2019) are 
any indicator. In terms of a “shift of locus of authority” 
(Hall, 1993), the new competencies given to the Com-
mittee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety 
(COMENVI) (Euractiv, 2018) and the attention given to 
societal considerations in the EC (2017) Communication 
and in the proposal itself, indicate that there is a contest 
of authority present. Moreover, the new Commission 
seems at least in principle to be giving climate change 
and environmental considerations more weight. These 
are all elements indicating a change in the policy direc-
tion. However, the end result will be strongly dependent 
on the final legislation and especially implementation 
at the MS level, since Strategic Plans are not accurate-
ly defined and have many weaknesses that limit policy 
change in terms of increased environmental ambition at 
the Union level. 
While neither the content of the proposal nor the state-
ments of members of the policy community can be taken 
as prioritising environmental considerations over farmers’ 
incomes, the attention bestowed upon them may indicate 
a different development – the kind that Kay (2003) calls 
attention to. Namely, it is now clear that environmental 
elements have become an indispensable part of the CAP, 
not through revolution, but through evolution. Even farm 
representatives cite environmental ambition as a justifi-
cation for receiving funding, rather than rejecting it. This 
can be taken as an indication that environmental elements 
have themselves become a path dependent element of the 
policy. 
Still, the changes proposed by the EC have been met 
with considerable reservation by key stakeholders, the EP 
and most MSs. Since conservative decision-makers and 
agricultural interest groups still hold great sway over the 
decision-making process (de la Rosa, 2010; Greenpeace, 
2018), path dependency is likely to be strengthened along 
the dependent paradigm, limiting a shift towards the mul-
tifunctional one. As we have seen, numerous actors still 
adhere to the productivist, exceptionalist ideology that sets 
agriculture apart from other economic sectors (Burton & 
Wilson, 2006; van Dijk et al., 2016). Firstly, they see strate-
gic planning not as a step towards better policymaking, but 
as a hazard leading to extensive changes with insufficient 
funding. Secondly, they perceive increased environmental 
ambition as a threat and emphasize the impossibility of 
achieving it without increasing funding. They continue to 
push the policy along the dependent paradigm rather than 
making a shift to the multifunctional policy demanded by 
environmentalists and other stakeholders.
In our view, the divergence of national policy prefe-
rences is reflected in the fact that the Commission, while 
retaining a strong common element in the part of the po-
licy that is less contested and on which a large number of 
MSs depend (i.e. income support), has introduced a high 
level of flexibility to accommodate for different levels 
of environmental ambition, in essence proposing an EU 
of two (or more) speeds. By rejecting the “one-size-fits-
all’ approach (e.g. Agra-Facts, 2019c; CoEU, 2019f), the 
Commission is in fact conceding that a completely com-
mon policy is no longer feasible. This is in part due to 
differences between different parts of the EU in terms of 
perceptions of the role of agriculture (Wilson, 2001; Gar-
zon, 2005; Eurobarometer, 2018) and environmental con-
cerns, potentially related to the East-West divide (Wur-
zel et al., 2019). In this setting, the pressure to devolve 
responsibility and power to MSs - the move away from 
supranationalism - may be explained by the concept of 
“new intergovernmentalism” (Bickerton et al., 2015). Na-
mely, due to their economic, social and cultural differen-
ces, MSs have different interests with regard to the CAP 
and environment, are resisting further supranationalism 
and demanding increased independence and responsibili-
ty (subsidiarity). In line with Henke et al. (2017), we see 
a continuation of “national path dependency”; we argue 
that this devolution reflects the pressure of MSs for their 
situations to be taken into consideration, coupled with a 
political climate of Euroscepticism. Any kind of concerted 
paradigmatic shift at the EU level seems highly unlikely 
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in such a setting: while tailoring to individual needs of 
MSs is sensible, continuation of this trend may eventually 
lead to 27 distinct agricultural policies, rendering any dis-
cussion on one CAP paradigm moot.
In addition to contributing to the relevant literature by 
presenting substantive findings regarding paradigmatic 
shifts in the CAP, our analysis supports the claim that a com-
bination of theoretical frameworks is useful to explain CAP 
reform; our combination of the three models – social lear-
ning, path dependency and intergovernmentalism – has pro-
ven useful in elucidating the political-economic background 
of the proposal, as well as potential trajectories. Analysing 
policy changes at the beginning of the legislative procedure 
has also demonstrated its usefulness, as it has revealed the 
proposal’s shortcomings and the importance of the quality 
of reform proposals; however, it is also the main limitation 
of our study. 
Adding to the usual uncertainties surrounding the le-
gislative process, this particular CAP reform has been 
further complicated by the institution of a new EP and 
Commission, the inability to reach agreement on the 
EU’s Multiannual financial framework and especially 
the COVID-19 pandemic. The latter could constitute 
a true policy shock and set in motion a paradigm shift 
in a number of directions. It has put the CAP process 
on hold and invited new discussions regarding natio-
nal and EU self-sufficiency (not just in agri-food), as 
well as intra-EU solidarity. It has upended EU poli-
cymaking and a weak response by the EU may result 
in even stronger Eurosceptic tendencies; in addition, 
farm lobbies are seizing the opportunity to side-track 
environmental concerns as nonessential in the cu-
rrent situation. The CAP may truly be at a crossroads: 
only in hindsight will it be possible to judge whether, 
in which MSs, and in which direction a paradigm shift 
has occurred.
Policy recommendations
The analysis allows us to elaborate some policy re-
commendations. We propose that accountability structu-
res and mechanisms be improved in the legislative pro-
posals to improve the CAP’s environmental performance. 
Objectives require quantification at the EU level and as-
sociated legislation and objectives in other EU policies 
should be incorporated into quantitative definitions of 
objectives in the proposals. To support this approach, the 
analytical background in terms of quality, relevance and 
availability of data should be improved at both EU and 
national levels.
The role of the Commission in the approval process 
of the Strategic Plans should be strengthened in order to 
ensure the quality of the process. To improve the quality 
of the Plans themselves, MSs should formally obtain the 
opinion of environmental authorities (and other stakehol-
ders). Moreover, Strategic Plans, evaluations and results 
should be made available to EU stakeholders and the pu-
blic to facilitate comparative engagement, peer pressure 
and mutual learning, hopefully turning the process into a 
kind of “race to the top”.
Conclusions 
Evaluation of the proposed 2018 CAP reform and 
analysis of the responses of key interest groups has 
shown that the proposal does hold potential for a subs-
tantial overall greening of the policy, but will be strongly 
dependent on the implementation at the MS level. The 
elements supporting a shift are incorporated into provi-
sions regarding strategic planning and increased envi-
ronmental ambition, but the institutional framework does 
not guarantee it; the newly introduced flexibility leaves 
the decision to MSs. 
Due to strong elements of path dependency and new 
intergovernmentalism, a radical paradigm shift seems 
very unlikely. Decision-making is too strongly influenced 
by agricultural stakeholders who favour the status quo 
(PD), while strengthening the role of MSs (intergovern-
mentalism) is weakening the commonality of the policy 
that guarantees at least minimal environmental standards. 
The proposed safeguards are too weak and should be 
strengthened through more accountability during the for-
mulation and implementation of Strategic Plans. Without 
this, the demands of the public for an environmentally 
stronger CAP will go unheeded. To achieve paradigma-
tic change, however, public demands are not enough in 
themselves; preparing a viable proposal able to engender 
meaningful change requires understanding the complex 
policy environment and the political and economic forces 
blocking change.
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